Gay dating website gps
Hornet and Jack’d have options to obscure the exact distance between users’ phones, adding noise to obscure that trilateration attack.
The lingering issue, however, remains: All three apps still show photos of nearby users in order of proximity.
Ten minutes after that, he sent me a screenshot from Google Maps, showing a thin arc shape on top of my building, just a couple of yards wide. Hoang says his Grindr-stalking method is cheap, reliable, and works with other gay dating apps like Hornet and Jack'd, too.
(He went on to demonstrate as much with my test accounts on those competing services.) In a paper published last week in the computer science journal Transactions on Advanced Communications Technology, Hoang and two other researchers at Kyoto University describe how they can track the phone of anyone who runs those apps, pinpointing their location down to a few feet.
Within fifteen minutes, Hoang had identified the intersection where I live. In fact, the outline fell directly on the part of my apartment where I sat on the couch talking to him.
Hoang advises that people who truly want to protect their privacy take pains to hide their location on their own, going so far as to run Grindr and similar apps only from an Android device or a jailbroken i Phone with GPS spoofing software.
As Jack'd notes, people can also avoid posting their faces to the dating apps.
But after a slightly longer hunting process, Hoang was still able to identify my location.
And Jack'd, despite claims to "fuzz" its users' locations, allowed Hoang to find me using the older simple trilateration attack, without even the need to spoof dummy accounts.